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Abstract
k-Anonymity and ε-differential privacy are two mainstream privacy models, the
former introduced to anonymize data sets and the latter to limit the knowledge
gain that results from including one individual in the data set. Whereas basic
k-anonymity only protects against identity disclosure, t-closeness was presented
as an extension of k-anonymity that also protects against attribute disclosure.
We show here that, if not quite equivalent, t-closeness and ε-differential privacy
are strongly related to one another when it comes to anonymizing data sets.
Specifically, k-anonymity for the quasi-identifiers combined with ε-differential
privacy for the confidential attributes yields stochastic t-closeness (an extension
of t-closeness), with t a function of k and ε. Conversely, t-closeness can yield ε-
differential privacy when t = exp(ε/2) and the assumptions made by t-closeness
about the prior and posterior views of the data hold.
Keywords: t-closeness, ε-differential privacy, data anonymization
1. Introduction
k-Anonymity and ε-differential privacy are two mainstream privacy models
originated within the computer science community. Their approaches towards
disclosure limitation are quite different: k-anonymity is a model for releases of
microdata (i.e. individual records) that seeks to prevent record re-identification
by hiding each original record within a group of k indistinguishable anonymized
records, while ε-differential privacy seeks to limit the knowledge gain between
data sets that differ in one individual. Both models are often presented as antag-
onistic: ε-differential privacy supporters view k-anonymity as an old-fashioned
privacy notion that offers only poor disclosure limitation guarantees (they argue
that generating a a ”noisy table” that safely provides accurate answers to arbi-
trary queries is not feasible [11]), while ε-differential privacy detractors criticize
the limited utility of ε-differentially private outputs [24, 2].
In this paper we show that t-closeness (one of the extensions of k-anonymity)
and ε-differential privacy turn out to be strongly related when it comes to
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anonymizing data sets. Specifically, k-anonymizing the quasi-identifiers of a
data set and ensuring ε-differential privacy for the confidential attributes yields
stochastic t-closeness (which in turn is an extension of t-closeness), with t a
function of ε and of the size of the k-anonymity equivalence classes. Attain-
ing standard t-closeness from ε-differential privacy is unfeasible because, being
ε-differential privacy a stochastic mechanism, it is not possible to meet the re-
quirements that t-closeness puts on the empirical distribution of the confidential
attributes. To circumvent this issue, we introduce stochastic t-closeness, which
is defined on the theoretical distribution of the confidential attribute that re-
sults from the masking procedure (rather than on a specific realization of it).
Conversely, t-closeness can yield guarantees similar to ε-differential privacy for
the confidential attribute. Attaining exact ε-differential privacy from t-closeness
is unfeasible because, for instance, t-closeness fails to provide any protection if
we assume that all the records except one are known by the intruder. However,
if the assumptions made by t-closeness about the prior and posterior views of
the data by the intruder hold, then the protection we get from t-closeness is
equivalent to that of ε-differential privacy.
Section 2 contains background on k-anonymity, t-closeness and ε-differential
privacy. Section 3 introduces the concept of stochastic t-closeness. Section 4
shows that combining k-anonymity and differential privacy as sketched above
yields (stochastic) t-closeness. Section 5 shows that, under the assumptions
made by t-closeness about the prior and posterior views of the data, t-closeness
provides differential privacy-like privacy guarantees for the confidential attributes.
A construction to attain t-closeness that relies on bucketization is presented in
Section 6. Section 7 reviews related work. Conclusions and future research
issues are summarized in Section 8.
The material in Section 6 was presented in the conference paper [28]. The
rest of sections in this paper are new.
2. Background
2.1. k-Anonymity
Assume a data set X from which direct identifiers have been suppressed,
but which contains so-called quasi-identifier attributes, that is, attributes (e.g.
age, gender, nationality, etc.) which can be used by an intruder to link records
in X with records in some external database containing direct identifiers. The
intruder’s goal is to determine the identity of the individuals to whom the values
of confidential attributes (e.g. health condition, salary, etc.) in records in X
correspond (identity disclosure). See [17] for further details on disclosure attacks.
A data set X is said to satisfy k-anonymity [27, 26] if each combination
of values of the quasi-identifier attributes in it is shared by at least k records.
We use the term equivalence class to refer to a maximal set of records that are
indistinguishable with respect to the quasi-identifiers. k-Anonymity protects
against identity disclosure: given an anonymized record in X, an intruder cannot
determine the identity of the individual to whom the record (and hence the
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confidential attribute values in it) corresponds. The reason is that there are at
least k records in X sharing any combination of quasi-identifier attribute values.
The most usual computational procedure to attain k-anonymity is gener-
alization of the quasi-identifier attributes [26], but an alternative approach is
based on microaggregation of the quasi-identifier attributes [7].
2.2. t-Closeness
While k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure, as mentioned above,
it does not protect in general against attribute disclosure, that is, disclosure
of the value of a confidential attribute corresponding to an external identified
individual. Let us assume a target individual T for whom the intruder knows
the identity and the values of the quasi-identifier attributes. Let GT be a group
of at least k anonymized records sharing a combination of quasi-identifier at-
tribute values that is the only one compatible with T ’s quasi-identifier attribute
values. Then the intruder knows that the anonymized record corresponding to
T belongs to GT . Now, if the values for one (or several) confidential attribute(s)
in all records of GT are the same, the intruder learns the values of that (those)
attribute(s) for the target individual T .
The property of l-diversity [23] has been proposed as an extension of k-
anonymity which tries to address the attribute disclosure problem. A data
set is said to satisfy l-diversity if, for each equivalence class, there are at least l
“well-represented” values for each confidential attribute. Achieving l-diversity in
general implies more distortion than just achieving k-anonymity. Yet, l-diversity
may fail to protect against attribute disclosure if the l values of a confidential
attribute are very similar or are strongly skewed. p-Sensitive k-anonymity [30]
is a property similar to l-diversity, which shares similar shortcomings. See [8]
for a summary of criticisms to l-diversity and p-sensitive k-anonymity.
t-Closeness [20] is another extension of k-anonymity which also tries to solve
the attribute disclosure problem.
Definition 1. An equivalence class is said to satisfy t-closeness if the distance
between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution
of the attribute in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A table is said
to satisfy t-closeness if all its equivalence classes satisfy t-closeness.
t-Closeness clearly solves the attribute disclosure vulnerability, although the
original paper [20] did not propose a computational procedure to achieve this
property and did not mention the large utility loss that achieving it is likely to
inflict on the original data.
2.3. ε-Differential privacy
Differential privacy was proposed by [9] as a relative privacy model that
limits the knowledge gain between data sets that differ in one individual.
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Definition 2. A randomized function κ gives ε-differential privacy if, for all
data sets D1, D2 such that one can be obtained from the other by modifying a
single record, and all S ⊂ Range(κ)
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε)× Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S) (1)
Originally the focus was on the interactive setting; that is, to protect the
outcomes of queries to a database. The assumption is that an anonymization
mechanism sits between the user submitting queries and the database answering
them. The computational mechanism to attain ε-differential privacy is often
called ε-differentially private sanitizer. A usual sanitization approach is noise
addition: given a query f , the real value f(D) is computed, and a random
noise, say Y (D), is added to mask f(D), that is, a randomized response κ(D) =
f(D) + Y (D) is returned. To generate Y (D), a common choice is to use a
Laplace distribution with zero mean and ∆(X)/ε scale parameter, where:
• ε is the differential privacy parameter;
• ∆(f) is the L1-sensitivity of f , that is, the maximum variation of the
query function between neighbor data sets, i.e., sets differing in at most
one record.
Differential privacy was also developed for the non-interactive setting in [3,
14, 16, 4]. Even though a non-interactive data release can be used to answer an
arbitrarily large number of queries, in all these proposals this feature is obtained
at the cost of preserving utility only for restricted classes of queries (typically
count queries). This contrasts with the general-purpose utility-preserving data
release offered by the k-anonymity model.
3. Stochastic t-closeness
The fact that differential privacy is stochastic, while t-closeness is determin-
istic, makes it impossible to guarantee that a differentially private data set will
satisfy t-closeness. To bridge this gap, we introduce the concept of stochastic
t-closeness.
Let X be a data set with quasi-identifier attributes collectively denoted by
QI and confidential attributes C1, C2, · · · , Cn. Let N be the number of records
of X.
To attain t-closeness we need to partitionX into equivalence classes such that
the (empirical) distribution of the confidential attributes over the entire X is
close to the (empirical) distribution of the confidential attributes within each of
the equivalence classes: the distance between the former distribution and each of
the latter distributions must be less than a threshold value t. If c1, c2, · · · , cN are
the values of a confidential attribute in X, and c1, c2, · · · , c|E| are the values of
that attribute within equivalence class E, the respective empirical distributions
Pr(·) and PrE(·) can be computed as
Pr(B) =
1
N
∑
i=1,2,··· ,N
Pr1ci (B)
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and
PrE(B) =
1
|E|
∑
i=1,2,··· ,|E|
Pr1ci (B)
where B is any subset of values of the attribute, and P1ci (B) = 1 if and only if
ci ∈ B.
The standard practice to generate a t-close data set X ′ out of X favors pre-
serving the values of the confidential attributes within each of the equivalence
classes. Probably the reason has to do with t-closeness being an extension of
k-anonymity. k-Anonymity is not concerned with the values of the confidential
attributes and, thus, attaining k-anonymity does not require any operation on
them. t-Closeness was initially attained by incorporating its constraints into
k-anonymous data set generation algorithms; in this way, the values of the con-
fidential attributes within each equivalence class were kept unmodified. In [20]
and [21], the Incognito [19] and the Mondrian [18] algorithms that were designed
for k-anonymity are adapted for t-closeness. Modification of the confidential
values was considered in [25]. Let f be a function that masks the confidential
attributes to bring the empirical distribution of the modified equivalence classes
closer to the empirical distribution of the modified whole data set. Using the
previous notations, the modified empirical distributions are computed as
Pr(B) =
1
N
∑
i=1,2,··· ,N
Pr1f(ci)(B)
and
PrE(B) =
1
|E|
∑
i=1,2,··· ,|E|
Pr1f(ci)(B).
The previous masking function f is deterministic, but dealing with stochas-
tic masking functions would be interesting. Let Z be a stochastic function.
Attaining t-closeness is not possible for Z, as the actual values depend on each
specific realization of Z. However, there is a natural extension of the concept of
t-closeness that deals smoothly with stochastic functions. Basically, we have to
stop working with empirical distributions, and use the distributions determined
by Z instead. In terms of the formulas, we need to change 1f(·) by Z(·).
Definition 3. Let X ′ be a data set obtained from X by applying a stochastic
function Z to its confidential attributes. We say that X ′ satisfies stochastic
t-closeness if, for each equivalence class E, the distance between
Pr(B) =
1
N
∑
i=1,2,··· ,N
PrZ(ci)(B)
and
PrE(B) =
1
|E|
∑
i=1,2,··· ,|E|
PrZ(ci)(B)
is less than a threshold t.
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Although a deeper analysis of stochastic t-closeness might be interesting, our
aim here is to relate it to differential privacy and the above definition will suffice
to this aim.
4. From differential privacy to (stochastic) t-closeness
This section develops one of the main results in this paper: the implication
between ε-differential privacy and stochastic t-closeness. Before going into that
result, we need to deal with an important aspect of t-closeness: the distance
between the probability distributions used.
Stochastic t-closeness, just as t-closeness, is about making the distance be-
tween the data set-level and the equivalence class-level distribution of the confi-
dential attribute less than a threshold value t for any equivalence class. When t-
closeness was introduced, the Earth Mover’s distance (EMD) was proposed [20].
The EMD measures the minimal amount of work required to transform one
distribution into another by moving probability mass between each other.
The specific distance used can actually be viewed as an additional parameter
of t-closeness and it has a significant impact on the kind of privacy guarantees
offered. As we aim to show that differential privacy for the confidential at-
tributes leads to stochastic t-closeness, we take a distance function that is more
suited to differential privacy.
Definition 4. Given two random distributions D1 and D2, we define the dis-
tance between D1 and D2 as:
d(D1,D2) = max
S
{
PrD1(S)
PrD2(S)
,
PrD2(S)
PrD1(S)
}
where S is an arbitrary (measurable) set, and we take the quotients of probabil-
ities to be zero, if both PrD1(S) and PrD2(S) are zero, and to be infinity if only
the denominator is zero.
We are ready to move to the main result of the section: the implication
between differential privacy and t-closeness.
Proposition 1. Let X be an original data set and X ′ be a corresponding anonymized
data set such that the projection of X on the confidential attributes is ε-differentially
private. Then X satisfies stochastic t-closeness with
t = max
E
|E|
N
(
1 +
N − |E| − 1
|E| exp(ε)
)
where E is an equivalence class.
Proof. Let E be an equivalence class of X and let c1, c2, · · · , c|E| be the
values of the projection of X on the confidential attributes. For t-closeness to
hold, it must be PrE(B) ≤ t× Pr(B) and Pr(B) ≤ t× PrE(B), for any B.
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We start by deriving an inequality that will later be used. If Z satisfies
ε-differential privacy, we have exp(−ε) × PrZ(cj)(B) ≤ PrZ(ci)(B) ≤ exp(ε) ×
PrZ(cj)(B), for all i and j. In particular, we have
exp(−ε)
|E|
∑
j=1,2,··· ,|E|
PrZ(cj)(B) ≤ PrZ(ci)(B)
≤ exp(ε)|E|
∑
j=1,2,··· ,|E|
PrZ(cj)(B).
Let d =
∑
i=1,2,··· ,|E| PrZ(ci)(B). The previous equation becomes
1
|E| exp(−ε)d ≤
PrZ(ci) ≤ 1|E| exp(ε)d. By taking the sum for i in |E| + 1, |E| + 2, · · · , N , we
have
N − |E|
|E| exp(−ε)d ≤
∑
i=|E|+1,|E|+2,··· ,N
PrZ(ci)(B); (2)
∑
i=|E|+1,|E|+2,··· ,N
PrZ(ci)(B) ≤
N − |E|
|E| exp(ε)d. (3)
Now we turn to the t-closeness requirements. We start with PrE(B) ≤
t× Pr(B). This inequality can be rewritten as
1
|E|
∑
i=1,2,··· ,|E|
PrZ(ci)(B) ≤ t×
1
N
∑
i=1,2,··· ,N
PrZ(ci)(B).
In terms of d it becomes
1
|E| × d ≤ t
1
N
d+ ∑
i=|E|+1,|E|+2,··· ,N
PrZ(ci)(B)
 .
By Inequality (2) the following inequality implies the previous one
1
|E| × d ≤ t
1
N
(
d+
N − |E|
|E| exp(−ε)d
)
By operating on the previous inequality we get
t ≥ N|E|
(
1 +
N − |E|
|E| exp(−ε)
)−1
.
By following a similar process with inequality P (B) ≤ t×PE(B) we conclude
t ≥ |E|
N
(
1 +
N − |E|
|E| exp(ε)
)
.
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The conclusion is that if Z satisfies ε-differential privacy, then we get t-
closeness on X ′ for
t = max
E
{ N|E|
(
1 +
N − |E|
|E| exp(−ε)
)−1
,
|E|
N
(
1 +
N − |E|
|E| exp(ε)
)
}.
It can be seen that the second term is always greater than the first one,
which leads to
t = max
E
|E|
N
(
1 +
N − |E| − 1
|E| exp(ε)
)
.

There are two approaches to enforce t-closeness for a data set that contains
multiple confidential attributes: (i) take the confidential attributes together as
a single confidential attribute and seek t-closeness for it using the joint distri-
bution, and (ii) deal with each confidential attribute separately, that is, seek
t-closeness independently for each confidential attribute. The first approach is
stronger in terms of privacy guarantees, and it is the one we have used in the
previous proposition. If instead of having ε-differential privacy for the projec-
tion of the data set on the confidential attributes we had ε-differential privacy
for each individual attribute, then the second approach would be more suitable.
Proposition 2 shows that ε-differential privacy for the confidential attributes
implies (stochastic) t-closeness for a t that depends on the number of records,
the cardinality of the equivalence classes and ε. The proposition shows that ε-
differential privacy is stronger than (stochastic) t-closeness as a privacy model.
From a more practical point of view, Proposition 2 can be seen as a possible
approach to generate a t-close data set. The confidential attribute of such a
data set has not only the privacy guarantees provided by t-closeness but also
the ones given by ε-differential privacy.
5. ε-Differential privacy through t-closeness
In this section we show that if the conditions under which t-closeness provides
its privacy guarantee hold for a data set, then we have differential privacy on
the projection over the confidential attributes.
The quasi-identifier attributes are excluded from our discussion. The reason
is that t-closeness offers no additional protection to the quasi-identifiers beyond
what k-anonymity does. For example, we may learn that an individual is not
in the data set if there is no equivalence class in the released t-close data whose
quasi-identifier values are compatible with the individual’s.
The main requirement for the implication between t-closeness and differen-
tial privacy relates to the satisfaction of the t-closeness requirements about the
prior and posterior knowledge of an observer. t-Closeness assumes that the dis-
tribution of the confidential data is public information (this is the prior view of
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observers about the confidential data) and limits the knowledge gain between
the prior and posterior view (the distribution of the confidential data within the
equivalence classes) by limiting the distance between both distributions.
Similarly to Section 4, to make t-closeness closer in meaning to differential
privacy, we use the distance proposed in Definition 4. If the distributions D1 and
D2 of Definition 4 are discrete (as is the case for the empirical distribution of a
confidential attribute in a microdata set), computing the distance between them
is simpler: taking the maximum over the possible individual values suffices.
Proposition 2. If distributions D1 and D2 take values in a discrete set {x1, x2
· · · , xN}, then the distance d(D1,D2) can be computed as
d(D1,D2) = max
i=1,2,··· ,N
{
PrD1(xi)
PrD2(xi)
,
PrD2(xi)
PrD1(xi)
}
. (4)
Suppose that t-closeness holds; that is, the data set X ′ consists of several
equivalence classes selected in such a way that the multiplicative distance pro-
posed in Definition 4 between the distribution of the confidential attribute over
the whole data set and the distribution within each of the equivalence classes
is less than t. We will show that, if the assumption on the prior and posterior
views of the data made by t-closeness holds, then exp(ε/2)-closeness implies ε-
differential privacy. A microdata release can be viewed as the collected answers
to a set of queries, where each query requests the attribute values associated
to a different individual. As the queries relate to different individuals, check-
ing that differential privacy holds for each individual query suffices, by parallel
composition, to check that it holds for entire data set. Let I be a specific indi-
vidual in the data set. For differential privacy to hold for the query associated
to individual I, including I’s data in the data set vs not including them must
modify the probability of the output by a factor not greater than exp(ε), where
ε is differential privacy parameter.
Proposition 3. Let kI(D) be the function that returns the view on I’s confiden-
tial data given D. If the assumptions required for t-closeness to provide a strong
privacy guarantee hold, then exp(ε/2)-closeness on D implies ε-differential pri-
vacy of kI . In other words, if we restrict the domain of kI to exp(ε/2)-close
data sets, then we have ε-differential privacy for kI .
Proof. Let D1 and D2 be two data sets satisfying exp(ε/2)-closeness for the
combination of all confidential attributes. For ε-differential privacy to hold, we
need Pr(kI(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε) × Pr(kI(D2) ∈ S). We consider four different
cases: (i) I /∈ D1 and I /∈ D2, (ii) I /∈ D1 and I ∈ D2, (iii) I ∈ D1 and I /∈ D2,
and (iv) I ∈ D1 and I ∈ D2.
In case (i), the posterior view does not provide information about I beyond
the one in the prior view: we have kI(D1) = kI(D2). Hence, ε-differential
privacy is satisfied.
Cases (ii) and (iii) are symmetric. We focus on case (ii). Given the assump-
tions, we have that kI(D1) has the distribution of the confidential attribute on
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the whole table, while kI(D2) has the distribution of the confidential attribute
of the equivalence class that contains I. Because of exp(ε/2)-closeness, the dis-
tributions of kI(D1) and kI(D2) differ by a factor not greater than exp(ε/2)
and, therefore, satisfy ε-differential privacy.
Case (iv) is a composition of the previous case for kI(D1) and kI(D2). Both
kI(D1) and kI(D2) differ from the distribution of the confidential attribute on
the whole table by a factor of exp(ε/2). Thus, they differ from each other by a
factor not greater than exp(ε), as we wanted. 
Parallel to what we did in Section 4, the previous proposition deals with all
confidential attributes at once. That is, we assume that t-closeness holds for the
combination of all the confidential attributes and we see that we get differential
privacy for the same combination of attributes. If t-closeness is satisfied only for
a specific confidential attribute (or subset of confidential attributes), then we
get differential privacy for that attribute (or subset of confidential attributes).
Proposition 3 shows that, if the assumptions of t-closeness about the prior
and posterior views of the intruder are satisfied, then the level of disclosure
risk limitation provided by t-closeness is as good as the one of ε-differential
privacy. Of course, differential privacy is independent of the prior knowledge, so
Proposition 3 does not apply in general. However, when it applies, it provides
an effective way of generating an ε-differentially private data set.
6. A bucketization construction to attain t-closeness
We want to reach t-closeness using the distance of Definition 4. A problem
we face is that t-closeness is not attainable if there are confidential attribute
values with multiplicity less than the number of equivalence classes. The reason
is that, when an equivalence class lacks one of the values of the confidential
attribute, the distance between the equivalence class-level distribution and the
data set-level distribution is infinity (according to Definition 4). To circumvent
this issue, instead of working with the empirical distribution of the confidential
attribute, we work with a bucketized version of it, where points are clustered
into a set of buckets B1, B2, · · · , Bn.
Before going into the details, we give an overview of the steps required to
attain t-closeness. Figure 1 shows two sets of data. At the top there are the
original values of the confidential attribute. According to the previous discus-
sion, t-closeness (for a finite t) is not feasible for it. At the bottom, there is a
version of the confidential attribute where data have been clustered in buckets
B1, B2 and B3 that contain four points each. The granularity reduction of the
data makes it feasible to attain t-closeness for a finite t.
For instance, Figure 2 shows a partition of the data set in equivalence classes
that satisfies 1.5-closeness, according to the previously defined distance. The
empirical distribution of the original data assigns probability 1/3 to each of the
buckets B1, B2 and B3; hence, the bucket-level distribution D of the confidential
attribute in the original data set is Pr(B1) = Pr(B2) = Pr(B3) = 1/3. Each
of the equivalence classes in the partition (E1, E2, E3) takes either one or two
10
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Figure 1: Top, original confidential attribute values. Bottom, bucketized confidential attribute
values.
1/3 1/3 1/3
original data
1/2 1/4 1/4
equivalence class E1
1/21/4 1/4
equivalence class E2
1/4 1/4 1/2
equivalence class E3
Figure 2: Sample partition that satisfies 1.5-closeness
points from each bucket. Thus, the bucket-level empirical distribution D(E1) of
the confidential attribute for equivalence class E1 is Pr(B1) = 1/2 and Pr(B2) =
Pr(B3) = 1/4; for equivalence class E2, the distribution, denoted by D(E2),
is Pr(B1) = Pr(B3) = 1/4 and Pr(B2) = 1/2; for equivalence class E3, the
distribution, denoted by D(E3), is Pr(B1) = Pr(B2) = 1/4 and Pr(B3) = 1/2.
By using Equation (4) to measure the distance between D and D(Ei), for all i,
we conclude that the generated partition satisfies 1.5-closeness. In Figure 2 we
have depicted both the original set of values of the confidential attribute and
the generated buckets.
The rest of the section focuses on determining the conditions that the buck-
etization and the partition in equivalence classes must satisfy to maximize data
utility. To fix notations, we assume a data set X of size N . The granularity
of the confidential attribute is reduced by considering b buckets B1, B2, · · · , Bb,
each of them containing bi original values (that is, each of them having probabil-
ity bi/N). The partition in equivalence classes consists of e equivalence classes
E1, E2, · · · , Ee, each of them containing ei (bucketized) records. Let k be the
minimum among the ei’s.
The necessary condition, discussed at the beginning of the section, for t-
closeness to be attainable can be reformulated according to the stated notation
as bi ≥ e for all i.
6.1. Optimal bucketization
The selected bucketization of the confidential attribute has a large impact
on data utility. To minimize the damage to data utility we should generate
11
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Figure 3: Probability distributions satisfying 2-closeness with the distance of Definition 4
buckets that are as homogeneous as possible. In general, if a distance function
is used to measure the similarity of the values of the confidential attribute, a
clustering algorithm can be used to generate homogeneous buckets. The size of
the buckets is a parameter that can have a large impact on bucket homogeneity:
the smaller the buckets, the more homogeneous they can be. However, taking
too small buckets may defeat the purpose of the bucketization, that is, reducing
the granularity of the confidential attribute so that t-closeness is attainable. In
this section we seek to determine the optimal bucket size.
Figure 3 illustrates two probability distributions: the uniform distribution
represents the global distribution of the confidential attribute (over the whole
data set), and the other distribution corresponds to the confidential attribute
restricted to an equivalence class Ei. These two distributions satisfy 2-closeness
with the distance of Definition 4: the density of the restriction to Ei is 1/2 for
the entire range of values of the confidential attribute, except for a subrange
where it is 2.
When bucketizing the distributions in Figure 3, the subrange with density
2 should exactly correspond to a bucket or a union of buckets, in order to
maximize the utility of the resulting data. This is illustrated in Figure 4, whose
top row shows bucketized versions of the distributions of Figure 3 using three
buckets: top left graph, bucketized version of the global distribution; top right
graph, bucketized version of the restriction to Pi. Note that, for each of the
buckets, the global probability and the probability restricted to Ei differ by a
multiplicative factor of two; that is, we attain 2-closeness with equality for each
of the buckets. The bottom row of Figure 4 shows the bucketized versions of the
distributions in Figure 3 using two buckets. It can be seen that, with the two
proposed buckets, both bucketized distributions are identical; that is, we get
1-closeness, which is stronger than the intended 2-closeness, but comes at the
cost of data utility loss. Therefore, the number and hence the probability mass
of the optimal buckets is dependent on the level of t-closeness that we want.
According to the previous example, if the privacy requirement is t-closeness,
for a certain t, it seems reasonable to use up the allowed distance t between the
global distribution of the confidential attribute and the restriction of that dis-
tribution within each equivalence class. Using up the allowed distance between
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Figure 4: Bucketized distributions of the confidential attribute for the whole data (left) and
for an equivalence class Ei (right). Three buckets are considered in the top distributions, and
two in the bottom ones.
the confidential attribute distributions enables forming equivalence classes that
are more homogeneous, and hence decreases information loss.
Let us now put together what we said about the homogeneity and size of the
buckets, and about the equivalence classes that emphasize a specific bucket (the
probability distribution of the restriction to each equivalence class must differ
from the global distribution by a factor of t for a specific bucket, and by a factor
of 1/t for the rest of buckets). The conclusion is that we should set off for the
maximum number of buckets (thus, for buckets that are as small as possible)
but with the constraint that equivalence classes should be able to emphasize a
specific bucket. This is formulated as
t× bi/N + 1
t
× (1− bi/N) = 1
for all i. The result is bi = N/(t+1) for all i. That is, the optimal bucketization
consists of t+1 buckets of size N/(t+1). Notice that the optimal bucketization is
only attainable if t+ 1 divides N ; otherwise we should select the closest feasible
bucketization.
6.2. t-Closeness construction
Consider the original data set X = {(qii, ci)|i = 1, 2, · · · , N}, where qii
refers to the quasi-identifier attributes, and ci to the confidential attribute. We
want to generate a k-anonymous t-close data set X ′.
According to Section 6.1, we need to reduce the granularity of the confidential
attribute. In particular, it was proposed to group the values of the confidential
attribute in t+1 buckets of N/(t+1). records. In general a clustering algorithm
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Table 1: Theoretical probability mass of the distribution of the confidential attribute in each
of the buckets corresponding to the discretization of the confidential attribute.
B1 B2 · · · Bt+1
Original data 1/t+1 1/t+1 · · · 1/t+1
E1 t/t+1 1/t(t+1) · · · 1/t(t+1)
E2 1/t(t+1) t/t+1 · · · 1/t(t+1)
...
...
...
...
Et+1 1/t(t+1) 1/t(t+1) · · · t/t+1
is used to generate a set of buckets that maximize intra-bucket homogeneity.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the records can be ordered
in terms of the confidential attribute ci (this is possible if ci is numerical or
ordinal). In this case the buckets are:
B1 = {c1, c2, · · · , c[ Nt+1+0.5]},
B2 = {c[ Nt+1+0.5]+1, c[ Nt+1+0.5]+2, · · · , c[2× Nt+1+0.5]},
...
Bt+1 = {c[t× Nt+1+0.5]+1, c[t× Nt+1+0.5]+2, · · · , cN}.
The k-anonymous t-close data set is generated as follows:
1. Replace the values of the confidential attribute in the original data set D
by the corresponding buckets, and call D¯ the resulting data set;
2. Partition D¯ in equivalence classes of k (or more) records.
In the second step above, not all values of k are equally suitable. For instance,
it must be k ≥ t+ 1, because we showed in Section 6.1 that b ≤ k and b = t+ 1.
In fact, we can write:
k =
N
(t+ 1)l
where l ≥ 1 is a natural number that counts the number of equivalence classes
that emphasize each of the buckets. In fact, if we take into account the previous
inequality k ≥ t+ 1, we conclude that l belongs to the set {1, 2, · · · ,
⌊
N
(t+1)2
⌋
}.
Similarly to the discretization of the confidential attribute, the value of k pro-
duced by the previous formula may not be an integer. In that case we need to
adjust the size ei of each equivalence class Ei to
ei =
[
i
N
(t+ 1)l
]
−
[
(i− 1) N
(t+ 1)l
]
.
Table 1 gives the theoretical probability mass of each bucket of the confi-
dential attribute for each of the equivalence classes. We assume that l = 1 and
that equivalence class E1 emphasizes bucket B1, E2 emphasizes bucket B2, and
so on. The exact theoretical probability masses may not be achievable due to
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the discrete nature of the data. First of all, it may not be possible to obtain
a discretization of the confidential attribute in buckets with probability mass
1/(t + 1). Also, when generating the k-anonymous partition E1, E2, · · · , Et+1,
it may not be possible for each of the groups to contain exactly k records. Let
pj = bj/N be the probability that a record in the original data set belongs to
bucket Bj . For t-closeness to be achieved, the following must hold for every
equivalence class Pi: (i) at most beipitc records must have Bi as the value for
the confidential attribute; and (ii) at least deipj/te records must have Bj as
the value for the confidential attribute. For these conditions to hold, we can
start selecting deipj/te records with confidential attribute Bj , for each j 6= i, and
complete the partition set with ei−t deipj/te records with confidential attribute
Bi.
6.3. t-Closeness algorithm
Let us now restate the whole bucketization and equivalence class generation
process in an algorithmic way:
1. Let the number of records in the original data set be N .
2. Let t be the desired level of t-closeness.
3. Cluster the N values of the confidential attribute in the original data set
into b = t+ 1 buckets in such a way that:
(a) the probability mass of each bucket is as close as possible to 1/b, that
is, each bucket contains [N/b] values, except for some buckets that
contain [N/b] + 1 values (when N is not divisible by b);
(b) values within a bucket are as similar as possible. E.g. for a nu-
merical or ordinal confidential attribute, each bucket would contain
consecutive values. In general, a clustering algorithm can be used.
In this way, we can view the bucketized distribution of the confidential
attribute in the original data set as being uniform.
4. Partition the records in the bucketized data set into a number of equiva-
lence classes, in such a way that every equivalence class satisfies that:
(a) it contains k (or more) records, in view of achieving k-anonymity;
(b) no bucket contains a proportion of the confidential attribute values
of the equivalence class higher than t/b or lower than 1/(tb) (that
is, so that the bucketized distribution of the confidential attribute
in the group is at distance less than t from the bucketized distribu-
tion of the confidential attribute in the overall data set, according to
Definition 4).
7. Related Work
Our proposal aims to find links between syntactic privacy models (in par-
ticular, t-closeness) and differential privacy. Syntactic privacy models require
the anonymized data set to have a specific form that helps reducing the dis-
closure risk. k-Anonymity [27, 26], l-diversity [23], and t-closeness [20, 21] are
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among the most popular syntactic privacy models. These privacy models are
based on specific intruder scenarios, and they aim at avoiding data set config-
urations that are disclosive under these intruder scenarios. Syntactic models of
privacy are known to have several issues such as their limited utility for high-
dimensional data sets [1] and the vulnerabilities they present against several
attacks [5, 23, 20]. Perhaps the most prominent issue with syntactic privacy
models has to do with the intruder scenario: if the level of knowledge of the
intruder is greater than assumed, the protection achieved may be ineffective.
Differential privacy [9, 12] was introduced to provide a strong privacy model
that addresses the vulnerabilities of previous privacy models. To this end, dif-
ferential privacy takes a relative approach to disclosure limitation: the risk of
disclosure must be only slightly affected by the inclusion or removal of any spe-
cific record in the data set. In this way, differential privacy avoids the need to
make assumptions about intruder scenarios (an intruder that knows everything
but one record is implicitly assumed).
The dissimilar approaches to disclosure risk limitation taken by differential
privacy on the one hand and syntactic models on the other hand have motivated
mutual criticism between both families of methods. For example, [10, 13, 11]
justify the use of differential privacy by criticizing several statistical disclosure
control techniques such as query restriction, input perturbation and even output
perturbation (the basis of differential privacy) when applied naively. On the
contrary [24, 2] criticize differential privacy because of the limited utility it
provides for numerical data. Other criticisms to differential privacy are related
to the unboundedness of the responses and to the selection of the ε parameter.
See [6] for a more detailed comparison between syntactic privacy models and
differential privacy.
Despite the above controversies, some attempts to find connections between
differential privacy and syntactic privacy models have been made. In [22] it is
shown that when k-anonymization is done “safely” it leads to (ε, δ)-differential
privacy (a generalization of differential privacy). The randomness required for
differential privacy to hold is introduced by a random sampling step. In con-
trast to [22], which only goes from k-anonymity to (ε, δ)-differential privacy,
we show both implications between ε-differential privacy and t-closeness. The
approach used to introduce the uncertainty required by ε-differential privacy
is also different; while [22] make use of an additional sampling step, we take
advantage of the assumptions made by t-closeness about the prior and poste-
rior views of the data. Connections between syntactic models of privacy and
differential privacy are not limited to the satisfiability of one family given the
other. In [15] an interesting mix between differential privacy and k-anonymity
is proposed. Essentially, ε-differential privacy is relaxed to require individuals
to be indistinguishable only among groups of k individuals. In [29] k-anonymity
is used as an intermediate step in the generation of an ε-differentially private
data set. The use of k-anonymity reduces the sensitivity of the data, thereby
decreasing the amount of noise required to satisfy differential privacy.
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8. Conclusions and future research
This paper has highlighted and exploited several connections between k-
anonymity, t-closeness and ε-differential privacy. These models are more related
than believed so far in the case of data set anonymization.
On the one hand we have introduced the concept of stochastic t-closeness,
which, instead of being based on the empirical distribution like classic t-closeness,
is based on the distribution induced by a stochastic function that modifies
the confidential attributes. We have shown that k-anonymity for the quasi-
identifiers combined with ε-differential privacy for the confidential attributes
yields stochastic t-closeness, with t a function of ε, the size of the data set
and the size of the equivalence classes. This result shows that differential pri-
vacy is stronger than t-closeness as a privacy notion. From a practical point of
view, it provides a way of generating an anonymized data set that satisfies both
(stochastic) t-closeness and differential privacy.
On the other hand, we have demonstrated that the k-anonymity family of
models is powerful enough to achieve ε-differential privacy in the context of data
set anonymization, provided that a few reasonable assumptions on the intruder’s
side knowledge hold. Specifically, using a suitable construction, we have shown
that exp(ε/2)-closeness implies ε-differential privacy. The construction of a
t-close data set based on the distance function in Definition 4 has also been
detailed. Apart from partitioning into equivalence classes, a prior bucketization
of the values of the confidential attribute is required. The optimal size of the
buckets and the optimal size of equivalence classes have been determined.
The new stochastic t-closeness model opens several future research lines.
Being a generalization of t-closeness, we can expect stochastic t-closeness to
allow better data utility. Comparing the utility obtainable with both types
of t-closeness is an interesting future research line that requires devising a con-
struction to reach stochastic t-closeness (other than the one based on differential
privacy). Exploring whether and how stochastic t-closeness (rather than stan-
dard t-closeness) could yield ε-differential privacy is another possible follow-up
of this article. Finally, it would also be interesting to compare in terms of pri-
vacy and utility the impact of the distance between distributions proposed in
the article and the earth mover’s distance.
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